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Abstract
Recently, several central banks have abandoned the usual secrecy in monetary policy and become
very  transparent. This  paper  provides  an  explanation  for  this  puzzling  fact,  focussing  on  the
disclosure of central bank forecasts. It shows that transparency reduces the inflationary bias and
gives the central bank greater flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. Furthermore, it
makes it easier for a central bank to build reputation. To achieve these benefits of transparency it is
generally necessary to publish the conditional central bank forecasts for both inflation and output.
JEL classification: E52, E58.
Keywords: Transparency, monetary policy.ECB Working Paper No 41  January 2001 61 Introduction
Central banks have long been associated with secrecy. Recently, however, several central
banks, including the Bank of England, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, have emphatically embraced transparency in several aspects, including the disclo-
sure of internal forecasts. The move towards transparency coincided with other signiﬁcant
changes in their institutional or policy design, in an apparent attempt to break with rela-
tively high inﬂation in the past. This is puzzling in light of the many theoretical arguments
in favor of secrecy in monetary policy. One advantage of transparency is that it improves
democratic accountability. However, it is not clear whether transparency has any economic
beneﬁts. This paper presents a formal argument how transparency could be beneﬁcial for
central banks and enhance their reputation. It focuses on a speciﬁc aspect of transparency,
the publication of central bank forecasts.
Intuitively, the advantage of opaqueness about economic forecasts is that it limits loss of
reputation for a weak central bank that prefers inﬂationary policy, because it obscures its true
intent. However, lack of transparency could be harmful for the reputation of a strong central
bank that is averse to inﬂation. For example, suppose the European Central Bank (ECB)
reduces interest rates to stimulate the economy in response to signs of slacking demand
in the euro zone. If the market is unsure of the true cause, it may interpret this as a sign
of inﬂationary policy, destroying the ECB’s incipient reputation. As a result, despite the
usual secretiveness in monetary policy, transparency could be useful and improve the central
bank’s ability to gain reputation.
The model in this paper is in the tradition of the discretionary monetary policy games ﬁrst
described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and later formalized by Barro and Gordon (1983).
It is a simple two-period model with a Phillips relation and an implicit inﬂation target for
the central bank. However, it distinguishes itself from most previous models in two respects.
There is an explicit distinction between a regime of opaqueness and transparency, where the
latter corresponds to the publication of conditional central bank forecasts for inﬂation and
output. In addition, the model features a real interest rate transmission mechanism, so the
nominal interest rate acts as both the policy instrument and a signal of the central bank’s
intentions.
The central bank’s reputation, measured by the public’s inﬂation expectations, plays a salient
role. The reputation effects are based on rational updating by the public based on the central
bank’s actions, like Backus and Drifﬁll (1985) and Barro (1986). The public uses the interest
rate to infer the central bank’s inﬂation target. In the case of opaqueness, this signal is noisier






















Figure 1: A conceptual framework for transparency.
and the market’s inﬂation expectations are less responsive to the central bank’s attempts to
establish a reputation. When there is an inﬂationary bias, the central bank has an incentive to
build reputation through higher interest rates. Since the market pays less attention to signals
from opaque central banks, they invest less in reputation which leads to higher inﬂation. As
a result, the public prefers transparency. Since transparency has the effect of revealing the
central bank’s type, weak central banks would rather have opaqueness.
When the central bank cares about the variability of output, transparency has another advan-
tage. It gives the central bank greater ﬂexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. The
reason is that the central bank is better off when the public correctly anticipates its inﬂation
target. So, a central bank operating under opaqueness limits its stabilization efforts to make
the interest rate a better signal of its type. It is forced to engage in interest rate ‘smoothing’
to prevent undesired effects on people’s inﬂation expectations. As a result, opaque central
banks no longer fully offset demand shocks, adding to volatility in the economy.
The conclusions of previous research related to information disclosure, or transparency, in
monetary policy are mixed. Most provide explanations for secrecy, but a few have recently
started to advocate openness. However, transparency is a multifaceted concept, so I propose
todistinguish the following ﬁveaspects: (i)openness about policy objectives, like explicit in-
ﬂation targets, (‘political transparency’), (ii) disclosure of economic data, models and central
bank forecasts (‘economic transparency’), (iii) information about the monetary policy strat-
egy and internal policy deliberations, for instance through the release of minutes and voting
records (‘procedural transparency’), (iv) communication of policy decisions, like changes
in the interest rate, and statements about likely future actions (‘policy transparency’), and
(v) openness about the implementation of policy decisions, market interventions and control
errors (‘operational transparency’, or more generally, ‘market transparency’). These aspects
of transparency are illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Each of them gives rise to different motives and
incentives for transparency.
8                                                                                                 ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001This paper focuses on the effect of economic transparency. It assumes that there is some
political uncertainty and the procedures can simply be described as discretionary monetary
policy by a single central banker. In addition, there is complete policy and operational
transparency as the policy instrument, the interest rate, is observed by the public and there
are no control errors.
Political transparency is analyzed by Nolan and Schaling (1996). They show that less un-
certainty about the central bank’s preferences can have a beneﬁcial effect and reduce the
inﬂation bias. Procedural and policy transparency, in particular the publication of minutes,
voting records and policy directives, are discussed by Goodfriend (1986) , Buiter (1999) and
Issing (1999). The disclosure of individual voting records is formally analyzed by Gersbach
and Hahn (2000). There are several models on operational transparency. In a seminal paper,
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) provide a motivation for operational ambiguity and show that
a central bank chooses to obfuscate shifts in its preferences through control errors. Using
a variation on their model, Faust and Svensson (1998) make an important contribution by
introducing a theoretical distinction between imperfect monetary control and (operational)
transparency. Transparency is modeled as the extent to which a central bank discloses the
monetary control errors which obscure its unobservable, shifting objectives, thus ultimately
providing a measure of (ex post) political transparency. Through simulations, they ﬁnd that
increased transparency generally improves social welfare, but Faust and Svensson (1999)
argue that minimum transparency is a likely outcome in practice. Thus, they are not able to
explain the deliberate choice for greater openness by an increasing number of central banks.
In a model similar to Faust and Svensson (1998) but with a New-Keynesian instead of the
standard Phillips curve, Jensen (2000) ﬁnds that greater transparency could actually reduce
social welfare, thus reviving the argument in favor of secrecy.
There are a few other papers on economic transparency. Gersbach (1998) and Cukierman
(1999) are similar to this paper in the sense that the publication of central bank forecasts
removes an information asymmetry about economic shocks. They consider a model with
a monetary transmission mechanism and ﬁnd that the disclosure of central bank forecasts
reduces welfare. The reason is that the central bank looses the ability to stabilize output as
supply shocks revealed by the forecasts are incorporated in inﬂation expectations. Cukier-
man (1999) also considers a model that features a real interest rate channel like this paper.
Although secrecy is no longer needed to achieve output stabilization, the publication of
central bank forecasts has a negative effect if social welfare is decreasing in the variability
of interest rates. These conclusions against economic transparency, however, hinge on the
assumption that there is perfect information about the central bank’s preferences.
Instead, this paper assumes that there is some uncertainty about the intentions of the central
ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001                                                                         9bank, reﬂecting the credibility problem that is inherent to unobservable preferences, and it
provides formal arguments in favor of economic transparency.
Tarkka and Mayes (1999) consider a completely different type of economic transparency by
focusing on (mutual) uncertainty about expectations. In their model, the public is not only
uncertain about the central bank’s preferences, but also about the central bank’s assessment
of the public’s inﬂation expectations. The publication of central bank forecasts removes
these uncertainties and leads to greater predictability of monetary policy.
These papers, including the present one, all assume that central bank forecasts are truthful
and that people are able to interpret them correctly. Winkler (1999) argues that effective
communication is not trivial; he proposes to view transparency in terms of openness, clar-
ity, honesty and common understanding. Garﬁnkel and Oh (1995) assume that central bank
forecasts are unveriﬁable and show how a central bank could partially reveal its private in-
formation through noisy forecasts. However, forecasts could in principle be veriﬁed. After
all, the data collection, modeling and forecasting activities performed by central bank staff
members could be delegated to an independent agency that reports to both the public and
monetary policymakers. When the forecasts used for decision making deviate from staff
forecasts and reﬂect policymakers’ judgement, an independent monitor could attend all pol-
icy meetings and release minutes with the arguments underlying the adjustments, thereby
exposing fudging of the forecasts. Thus, credibility is not a fundamental issue for economic
transparency. This is in contrast to political transparency, which concerns preferences that
can never be directly observed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2.
First, the transparency regime is analyzed in section 2.1. Subsequently, the consequences
of opaqueness are derived in section 2.2 and compared to those of transparency in section
2.3. The subtle difference between the publication of conditional versus unconditional fore-
casts is explained in section 2.4. Extensions to the basic model are described in section
3. Asymmetric information about the structure of the economy is addressed in section 3.1.
Section 3.2 provides an argument how market discipline could induce all central banks to be
transparent when the regime is endogenous. The model is analyzed for a quadratic central
bank objective function in section 3.3 and it is shown that opaqueness induces interest rate
‘smoothing’. Incentives for secrecy that may explain why many central banks shun greater
openness are discussed in section 3.4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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t is the level of aggregate real output;
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￿ is the implicit inﬂation



















y equals the natural rate of output;





is the weight on output stimulation (
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0); and the subscript


































t is the nominal interest rate;
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r is the long-run, ex ante real interest rate; and,
a is the sensitivity of output to the ex ante real interest rate (
a
>
0). The supply of output is












































where the inverse of






























The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate
i
t, following the actual practice
of most central banks. The public ﬁxes its inﬂation expectations
￿
e
t, so the central bank is






t. As a result, monetary policy has real






The timing is as follows. Before the ﬁrst period, a regime of transparency (
T) or opaqueness
(
O) is announced and the central bank commits to it. With transparency, the public has the






t as the central bank. Under opaqueness, the






t. Next, the inﬂation
target
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1. In the ﬁrst period, the central bank observes
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1, and subsequently sets the nominal interest rate
i
1.A tt h ee n do ft h e
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1) to update its prior on
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￿. At the beginning of the second period,














2, and determines the interest rate
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t perfectly. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for forecast
errors, but this does not affect any of the qualitative results.
Clearly, there is asymmetric information in the model. The public does not observe the cen-
tral bank’s inﬂation target
￿







forms its inﬂation expectations
￿
e
t. But, under transparency, the public gets all the informa-
tion that is available to the central bank when it sets the interest rate
i
t, except for its implicit
inﬂation target
￿
￿. It is assumed that the public has rational expectations.
The public uses the interest rate
i
1 to infer the central bank’s inﬂation target. Due to the




1 is not available when the
public forms its inﬂation expectations
￿
e
2. This reﬂects (implicit) lags in monetary policy;
changes in the policy instrument only take effect after a substantial lag. Meanwhile, people
adjust their expectations, which sets the stage for the next policy decision.
The problem can be solved by backwards induction. In period two, the central bank maxi-
mizes
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The nominal interest rate
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2. The demand shock
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2 is completely offset by monetary policy. Since the objective
function is linear in output, the supply shock
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s
2 does not affect the level of inﬂation
￿
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￿) of discretionary monetary policy. Substituting (7) and
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￿
e
2. Thus, it has
an incentive to improve its reputation through its actions in period one.
In the ﬁrst period, the central bank maximizes the expected value of
U with respect to
i
1


































It will be shown below that this rule is consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium.

















































The expression for the nominal interest rate is similar to the one for the second period, except
for the last term on the right-hand side. This term reﬂects the reputation effect of the interest
rate on inﬂation expectations in the next period.
To show that the updating equation for inﬂation expectations (9) is rational, and to compute
the values of
u and
v, it is necessary to distinguish between the regimes of transparency and
opaqueness. In principle, economic transparency obtains when the public has access to the
same economic information that is available to the central bank when it sets the interest rate
i
t, with the exception of the level of the unobservable inﬂation target
￿
￿. Thus, people are
able to infer the central bank’s type from its actions. The role of conditional central bank






t that affect the central bank’s behavior.
More precisely, let
i
C denote the interest rate that is used for the conditional forecast. Then
the public can use the conditional forecast for output
y
C




to deduce the demand shock
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d
t. Similarly, the supply shock
"
s










t and (4). Note that it is generally necessary to disclose cen-
tral bank forecasts for both output and inﬂation to achieve economic transparency. Perhaps
surprisingly, the publication of unconditional forecasts does not necessarily have the same
effect as that of conditional forecasts; this will be discussed in section 2.4. So, for the re-
mainder of the paper, (economic) transparency corresponds to the publication of conditional
central bank forecasts for inﬂation and output.
















































g summarizes the structure and parameters of the model.
When the public forms its inﬂation expectations
￿
e
2, the available information set equals



















g under opaqueness. For notational conve-


















O. Comparing transparency with opaqueness, the only dif-
ference is that in the case of transparency the public observes the economic disturbances to




































g. Using (7) and the fact that
i
1 in (10) is normally distributed because it
depends on
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The outcome under transparency will be derived ﬁrst.
2.1 Transparency
Under a regime of transparency, indicated by superscript









when it forms its inﬂation expectations
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2. It can therefore infer the inﬂation target
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￿ (ex
































































To get the outcomes in the ﬁrst period, the reputation coefﬁcient
v must be computed. Under
transparency, solving (10) for
￿









Thus, it is established that this is indeed a rational expectations equilibrium.3 The negative
value of
v












































0is also a solution. However,
￿
￿ is not directly observ-








1. Alternatively, one can use (10) and (11) to compute
v
T.
3Multiplerational expectations equilibriamay exist. However, thisistheonly onethat satisﬁestheMcCallum
(1983) criterion to employ a minimal set of state variables in the updating equation.
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e
2. The ﬁrst-period outcomes are obtained by substituting
v
T into (10), using (3) and (4),










































































































The ﬁrst period is different from the second period for two reasons: There is a reputation











￿ in period two. Regarding the
latter, the uncertainty about the central bank’s inﬂation target makes the level of output in
the ﬁrst period dependent on the central bank’s type. A higher inﬂation target
￿
￿ reduces the
interest rate and thereby increases output in period one.
The effect of reputation is to decrease both the nominal interest rate and inﬂation in period




1, the central bank chooses a higher (nominal and ex ante real)
interest rate, and thereby lower output and lower inﬂation, in period one to reduce inﬂation




1. This decreases the (nominal and ex ante real) interest rate.
Rational expectations ensure that the negative effect on output in period one is completely
offset, so there is no net effect on the ex ante real interest rate. As a result, lower inﬂation
expectations give rise to a lower nominal interest rate in period one. The effect of reputation
on inﬂation is more familiar. Although the ex ante real interest rate is the same, the lower
level of inﬂation expectations
￿
e
1 reduces the level of inﬂation, at least partly eliminating the











Substituting (12) into (8), and using (19) and (18), the expected payoff to the central bank in




















































To appreciate the beneﬁts of transparency it is important to look at the case of opaqueness
as well. Under a regime of opaqueness, indicated by superscript
O, using (10) and matching










































































under opaqueness because people cannot tell whether it reﬂects a weak central bank (high
￿
￿), or either a negative demand shock (low
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d

















0, it follows that
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period two gives the same outcome for
v as under transparency.5














































This shows that a positive net demand shock has a beneﬁcial effect on reputation under
opaqueness, because rational agents partly attribute the rise in interest rates to a low inﬂation
target
￿
￿ and reduce their inﬂation expectations correspondingly. In addition, the central
bank enjoys lower inﬂation expectations
￿
e
2 when its inﬂation target is higher than expected,
because the public believes that the lower level of interest rates is due to negative net demand
shocks instead.
The ﬁrst-period outcomes are obtained by substituting
v













































































































These expressions are similar tothose under transparency, (17), (18) and (19), except that un-
der opaqueness the discount factor is effectively reduced from
Æ to
￿
Æ. To facilitate compari-















] because the regime is exogenous and independent








1 ), but monetary policy is more expansionary in the sense that it leads







1 ). These seemingly contradictory results are due to the higher
level of inﬂation expectations
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2 as much under opaqueness because the signal is considered noisier.
So, the reputation effect
v of higher interest rates is diminished under opaqueness, giving














T. Thus, the central bank sets a higher level of the ﬁrst-period (nominal
and ex ante real) interest rate under opaqueness to contain inﬂation. Rational expectations
ensure that the levels of output are constant across the (random) regimes, so the ex ante real
interest rates are the same in both cases. Consequently, opaqueness brings about a higher
ﬁrst-period nominal interest rate. Although the ex ante real interest rate is the same in both
cases, the higher level of inﬂation expectations exerts its inﬂuence. As a result, opaqueness



















The analogy with the reputation argument in section 2.1 is striking. It appears that the
adoption of transparency and investment in reputation have a similar effect. Both reduce
the inﬂation bias. Moreover, transparency makes investment in reputation more fruitful. It
allows the public to identify the central bank’s efforts to stabilize economic shocks, which
produces a more accurate signal of the central bank’s type. Thus, transparency makes it
more enticing for the central bank to invest in reputation, resulting in lower inﬂation than
under opaqueness.
The size of the inﬂation bias under opaqueness is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio
￿.







￿ by diminishing the
severity of opaqueness, so it makes the inﬂation bias smaller. However, a reduction in the
ex ante uncertainty about the central bank’s inﬂation target
￿
2
￿ decreases the signal-to-noise
ratio
￿ and thereby increases the inﬂation bias. So, greater political transparency actually
makes a situation of economic opaqueness worse. Intuitively, when the public faces less
uncertainty about the central bank’s type, it pays less attention to the interest rate, which
reduces the payoff of investing in reputation and leads to higher inﬂation.7
To complete the analysis of opaqueness, substitute (22) into (8), and use (25) and (24) to get






and it is independent of the way inﬂation expectations are formed.
7This result is in sharp contrast to Nolan and Schaling (1996) who ﬁnd that greater preference transparency
reduces the inﬂation bias in a static model with an objective function that is quadratic in output. However, it
should be mentioned that their result is speciﬁc to the kind of preference uncertainty. They consider uncertainty
about theinﬂationstabilizationparameter (
￿), whichhas a convex effect on inﬂation, so that greater transparency
reduces inﬂation expectations and thereby the inﬂation bias. Less uncertainty about the output stabilization
parameter (
￿), which has a concave effect on inﬂation, actually increases the inﬂation bias. Uncertainty about
the inﬂation target (
￿
￿), which enters additively in inﬂation, has no effect in a static context.














































































but independent of economic shocks in both cases, and that the expected value of output


















). This suggests that the public
would prefer transparency. For simplicity, assume that society shares the central bank’s
objective function. This means that there is no principal-agent problem and that (2) can be
interpreted as a social welfare function. Using (20) and (26), the expected payoffs for the
























































































the public always prefers transparency.8
However, central banks do not necessarily agree with the desirability of transparency. Be-


























































So, strong central banks with low inﬂation targets would be happy to publish their forecasts,
whereas weak central banks with sufﬁciently high inﬂation targets would rather be enveloped
by secrecy. This suggests that if central banks could choose the regime themselves, strong
central banks would have a greater incentive to adopt openness. Endogeneity of the regime
will be further explored in section 3.2.
2.4 Conditional versus Unconditional Forecasts
So far, the analysis has focused on the publication of conditional forecasts, which are based
on the assumption of constant interest rates. However, the disclosure of unconditional fore-









































18                                                                                                ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001casts, which incorporate changes in the policy instrument, need not have the same effect. In
fact, releasing the unconditional forecast for inﬂation leads to the worst possible outcome.
To understand this it is important to realize that the release of conditional central bank fore-
casts both reduces the uncertainty about the central bank’s inﬂation target
￿
￿, and gives the
central bank better incentives to invest in reputation since market expectations are more sen-
sitive to the interest rate. The publication of the unconditional inﬂation forecast also reduces
uncertainty because it directly reveals the inﬂation target. But, the big difference is that the




￿. This means that the behavioral incentive
is absent. As a result, there is no reduction in the inﬂation bias.
Formally, let superscript
U denote the disclosure of the unconditional inﬂation forecast.


















































The same outcome can be obtained when the central bank releases unconditional forecasts








1 from the forecasts, and use this to deduce
￿
￿ from the interest rate. In that case, the
incentive effect is present and reduces the inﬂation bias. In principle, the public is indifferent
between either method. But when there is a (tiny) cost associated with the processing of a
forecast, the public simply relies on the unconditional inﬂation forecast and the full inﬂation
bias arises.
So, the publication of conditional or unconditional central bank forecasts both lead to ex
post political transparency as the market is able to infer
￿
￿. But, the incentive effect that
reduces the inﬂation bias need not be present in the case of unconditional forecasts as the
public may be tempted to ignore the central bank’s actions and focus on the unconditional
inﬂation forecast.9
3 Extensions
In this section several extensions to the basic model are analyzed. First, the results on eco-
nomic transparency are extended to include asymmetric information on the structure of the
economy. Second, a simple model is considered in which the transparency regime is endoge-
nous. Third, an alternative central bank objective function that is quadratic in both inﬂation
9Tarkka and Mayes (1999) favor the publication of unconditional forecasts. However, in their model there is
no inﬂation bias, so the beneﬁcial incentive effect of conditional forecasts is absent.
ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001                                                                          19and output will be examined. And fourth, several potentially important forces against trans-
parency are discussed.
3.1 Model Uncertainty
In the basic model in section 2, it is assumed that there maybe asymmetric information about
demand and supply shocks that affect the economy, but that there is perfect information
about the structure of the economy. In practice, economic transparency may also fail because
the public is uncertain about the model of the economy that the central bank adopts. Such
model uncertainty has two implications.
First, it complicates the interpretation of central bank forecasts. For instance, if the public
does not know the value of the natural rate of output
￿







t, from the conditional forecasts of output and inﬂation. So, the publication
of these central bank forecasts is no longer sufﬁcient to achieve economic transparency. The
central bank also needs to convey the level of the natural rate of output that is implicit in the
forecasts.
But even if there is no asymmetric information about economic shocks, uncertainty about
the central bank’s model of the economy can have an impact. Suppose the public is not sure
about the level of the long-run real interest rate
￿
r. This makes the nominal interest rate a
noisier signal of the central bank’s inﬂation target. As a result, inﬂation expectations become
less sensitive to the nominal interest rate which loosens the discipline imposed on the central
bank to reduce the inﬂation bias.10
This suggests that greater economic transparency, in terms of both economic shocks and the
economic model, is generally beneﬁcial.
3.2 Endogenous Regime
So far, the analysis was for an exogenous regime of transparency or opaqueness. In practice,
however, the regime need not be imposed by the public but could be chosen by the central
bank itself. Section 2.3 indicates that the regime preferred by the central bank depends on
its inﬂation target
￿
￿. In particular, strong central banks favor transparency, whereas weaker
types like opaqueness. But ifcentral banks choose their owntransparency regime, the market




























































￿ which increases inﬂation using (25).
















onecan distinguish anadditional reputation effect. Themarket updates itsexpectations about
the unobservable inﬂation target after the central bank’s choice of regime. This penalizes
opaque central banks, which therefore have a greater incentive to be transparent. In fact, the
negative feedback from the market in response to secrecy could induce all central banks to
become transparent.
To analyze the reputation effects associated with the choice of regime, consider the follow-
ing simpliﬁed model. First, the inﬂation target
￿


















0; the realization of
￿
￿ is only observed by the
central bank, but its distribution is common knowledge. Next, the central bank announces a

























































T. When the inﬂation target is higher than expected, the
central bank faces amore favorable trade-off between output andinﬂation which increases its
expected payoff. In the case of opacity, the deviation between actual and expected inﬂation
target persists longer so that the effect on the central bank’s expected payoff is larger than
under transparency. In addition, (27) reﬂects the assumption that on average, the public is













]). These properties are consistent with
the expected payoffs (20) and (26) in the exogenous regime model in section 2.11
The central bank chooses the regime that produces the highest expected payoff subject to







] are consistent with the
central banks’ choices that follow from those expectations. When the market’s beliefs off the
equilibrium path are also restricted to be rational, transparency is the unique, pure-strategy
perfect equilibrium.12 The proof of this result appears in appendix A.1.
Intuitively, weak central banks with high inﬂation targets are inclined to select opaqueness,
because it obscures their true type. But, the market realizes that opaqueness signals high







]. Thisloss ofreputation iscostly, and fewercentral
banks will prefer opaqueness. As it turns out, rational market expectations in combination
with a normal prior distribution of
￿
￿ make transparency the optimal choice for every type.
11It should be noted that the model in section 2 becomes nonlinear under opaqueness if not all cen-
























































0, so the expected central bank payoff in (27)
is consistent with a linearized version of the basic model.
12Without this restriction, no pure-strategy perfect equilibrium exists. Mixed equilibria, inwhich some central
bank types randomize between transparency and opaqueness, are possible but not considered here.
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cipline sufﬁces to make every bank transparent. However, this prediction is at odds with
the facts; not all central banks are transparent. This could be due to at least three reasons.
First, the maintained assumption of rationality of market expectations, both on and off the
equilibrium path, may be too strong. If the public applies Bayesian updating to form its
expectations, one would expect that a given situation of secrecy unravels to the transparency
equilibrium only gradually. Second, the model may be incorrect; in particular, the choice of
a central bank objective function that is linear in output may be too simplistic. To investigate
this possibility, a quadratic objective function is analyzed in the next section. Third, central
bankers may have other motives for secrecy. Political, ﬁnancial and bureaucratic incentives
against openness are discussed in section 3.4.
3.3 Quadratic Central Bank Objective
One may wonder to what extent the beneﬁts of economic transparency are speciﬁc to the
central bank’s objectives. This section analyzes the model in section 2, but for a central





























The outcomes for this speciﬁcation are derived in appendix A.2. This quadratic objective
function completely eliminates the reputation effect present under the linear objective (2),
because there is no inﬂation bias. So, it is no longer the case that transparency brings lower
(ﬁrst-period) inﬂation. In fact, with the quadratic objective, the expected value of inﬂation






























g. And so is the conditional expected value of output.13
Yet, economic transparency still makes adifference and gives rise to signiﬁcant beneﬁts. The
reason is that transparency induces more accurate expectations of the central bank’s inﬂation
target and that more accurate inﬂation expectations lead to a higher expected payoff.14 As
before, the magnitude of the effect of the interest rate
i

















￿), because the signal is noisier. Under transparency,
the central bank’s inﬂation target can already be perfectly inferred from its actions. But
under opaqueness, the central bank has an incentive to provide a more accurate signal of its
type. In its attempt to make the interest rate a better signal of its inﬂation target, it restrains
the stabilization of economic shocks. As a result, the effect of demand shocks on output is

































however, the reputation effects still apply and transparency reduces the inﬂation bias.
14For the latter, see (31) in appendix A.2.





























































































































































in a static context (and under transparency), demand shocks affect neither output nor inﬂa-













b, respectively.16 But, in the case of opaqueness, the central bank reduces the
adjustment of the interest rate to prevent distorting people’s expectations. So, it lets demand
shocks seep into inﬂation. Similarly, its interest rate response to supply shocks is smaller,
which leads to a diminished effect of supply shocks on output, but a larger effect on inﬂation.
Thus, a central bank under opaqueness no longer fully offsets demand shocks and no longer
vigorously counters supply shocks, even when it perfectly anticipates those shocks. Instead,
it engages in interest rate ‘smoothing’. For a given inﬂation target
￿
￿, the variability of the
























. But under trans-
parency, central banks need not worry about the repercussions their stabilization efforts have
on inﬂation expectations, because they know that people are able to interpret their actions
correctly. Thus, transparency has the advantage that it gives central banks greater ﬂexibility
to respond to economic shocks.
Given the beneﬁts of transparency, in terms of less uncertainty about the inﬂation target
and less volatility due to economic disturbances, it is not surprising that the public prefers
transparency when the regime is exogenous and the public shares the central bank’s objec-
tive function. However, central banks need not agree with the public when the regime is
endogenous. The reason is that the central bank’s expected payoff is concave in
￿
￿ and

































], the expected payoff under opaqueness is strictly lower than

















] are sufﬁciently different, central banks that are







], prefer to deviate
from transparency. If the beliefs off the equilibrium path are not restricted, transparency may
survive as a perfect equilibrium when the expected payoff is quadratic. But, when rational-
15These equations correspond to (41) and (42), and are derived in appendix A.2.
16Thisfollowsfrom(29)and(30),andforthecaseoftransparency(36)and(37).
17See (38) and (43).
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central bank types that adopt opaqueness.18
Regarding the publication of conditional versus unconditional central bank forecasts, both
result in ex post political transparency. So, the reduction in uncertainty is the same in both
cases. But, in contrast to the objective that is linear in output, the economic outcome is
identical whether conditional or unconditional forecasts are disclosed.19 The reason is that
the additional incentive effect is immaterial because the socially optimal level of inﬂation is
already obtained in either case.20











incentive-compatible for the central bank to reveal its internal forecasts truthfully so that the
public can correctly infer its inﬂation target. As a result, credibility of the central bank’s
forecasts is simply not an issue with the quadratic objective function (28).
3.4 Arguments for Obfuscation
There may be other motives for opacity. They could be political, ﬁnancial or bureaucratic.
First, transparency also means greater accountability. If a central bank lacks political inde-
pendence, transparency could make it more prone to political pressures. So, a central bank
with insufﬁcient independence may decide to envelop itself in secrecy to protect itself from
political inﬂuence. The same could hold for central banks that lack a clear political mandate,
like for instance the Federal Reserve.
Second, transparency gives central banks greater ﬂexibility to offset economic shocks, but
it also leads to larger ﬂuctuations in the interest rate. If the ﬁnancial sector is structurally
weak, a large change in the interest rate could trigger a crisis. So, in the presence of a weak
ﬁnancial sector, transparency should be applied with caution.
Finally, like any bureaucracy, central banks may have an incentive to hide mistakes or embar-
rassing forecasts, or to cherish the information rents that secrecy brings, like extensive media
attention (see Stiglitz 1999). Suppose that central bank ofﬁcials therefore attach a cost
C to
















O under opaqueness. This is a straightforward extension of the model. For
C suf-
18See appendix A.2 for further details.











































y, the incentive effect becomes rel-
evant again; the publication of unconditional forecasts can be detrimental because the public is able to use the
unconditional forecasts for inﬂation and output to infer the inﬂation target
￿
￿ without relying on the interest
rate.
24                                                                                                ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001ﬁciently large, transparency is no longer the perfect equilibrium for the linear speciﬁcation
in (27) and opaqueness will become more likely for the quadratic case. Clearly, such private
incentives make central banks more reluctant to adopt greater openness. Unfortunately, this
imposes a big cost on society.
4 Discussion
The analysis in this paper relies on two important presumptions. There is asymmetric in-
formation between the central bank and the public about the central bank’s preferences and
the economic information available to the central bank. In addition, the public’s inﬂation
expectations are affected by the interest rate set by the central bank. Both presumptions are
now substantiated.
First, the presence of asymmetric information about the central bank’s objectives may seem
questionable since many central banks have adopted explicit inﬂation targets. However,
such targets are often formulated as ranges. Moreover, they need not be perfectly cred-
ible. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) provide empirical support for this.
They show that the adoption of an explicit inﬂation target affects inﬂation expectations only
gradually. In fact, there is always likely to be some uncertainty about the central bank’s pref-
erences because they cannot be directly observed and may change over time. Since a slight





0) already sufﬁces, this assumption does
not seem contentious.21
Furthermore, it is assumed that there is asymmetric information about the economic situa-
tion. In practice, central banks do not seem to have an information advantage on economic
data, since data is generally released to the public as soon as it becomes available. In addi-
tion, many central banks publish their economic models. Nevertheless, central banks may
have a signiﬁcant advantage in the interpretation of economic information. They typically
have a large staff devoted to the explanation and prediction of the economy, which exceeds
the resources available to agents in the private sector. Thus, central banks are likely to have
different (and often better) economic forecasts than the market. Romer and Romer (1996)
provide evidence of such asymmetric information. They show that Federal Reserve forecasts
of inﬂation are superior to those of commercial forecasters, even at a short horizon of one
or two quarters ahead. This suggests that central banks may indeed have private informa-
tion about economic disturbances. Although the model assumes that the central bank has
21The assumption of a normal distribution for
￿




R). This may seem unre-
alistic, but it provides a good approximation when there are no (perfectly credible) ex ante boundaries on the
inﬂation target.
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Figure 2: Market expectations of inﬂation and the base rate in the United Kingdom.
superior information, the result on interest rate smoothing in section 3.3 only requires an
information asymmetry, and the conclusions of the basic model in section 2 already hold
when the private sector is merely unsure of the central bank’s forecasts of economic shocks.
The second presumption is that the inﬂation expectations of the market are inﬂuenced by the
central bank’s actions. Figure 2 shows the association between the central bank’s base rate
and market expectations of inﬂation in the United Kingdom. The latter reﬂect average ex-
pected inﬂation rates over a ﬁve, ten and twenty year horizon, derived from prices of nominal
and indexed government bonds (gilts).22 The ﬁgure displays astriking, negative relationship.
This is conﬁrmed by more formal econometric analysis. Regressing market inﬂation expec-
tations over a ten year horizon (INFL EXP) on a constant, the base rate (BASE RATE) and



























































































errors are in parentheses.23 The base rate has a negative effect on inﬂation expectations
22The base rate used is the repo rate on the ﬁrst day of the month. The inﬂation expectations are equal to the
zero coupon inﬂation curves at the speciﬁed horizons, using monthly averages. The data are from the Bank of
England, Statistical Abstract, tables 20.1 and 20.5, respectively.
23The lagged dependent variable is included to take care of autocorrelation. Regarding diagnostic tests,
26                                                                                                 ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001that is statistically signiﬁcant (with a p-value of 0.006). Similar results are obtained for the
ﬁve and twenty year horizons, or using a measure of the real base rate. A regression of
changes in inﬂation expectations on three-month changes in the base rate also tends to give a
signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient. These results suggest that the base rate has a negative effect
on market expectations of inﬂation, consistent with the updating of inﬂation expectations in
the model.24
Hence, the two presumptions underlying the model seem plausible.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed the effect of transparency in monetary policy, in particular the pub-
lication of central bank forecasts. It focuses on ‘economic transparency’, which gives the
public access to all economic information, like data, models and forecasts, pertinent to the
central bank’s decisions. The paper identiﬁes several beneﬁts of such transparency. It en-
hances the central bank’s ability to build reputation and reduces the inﬂation bias. In addi-
tion, it gives the central bank greater ﬂexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. These
advantages of economic transparency can be achieved through the publication of the condi-
tional central bank forecasts of both inﬂation and output. Furthermore, it is shown that when
the transparency regime is exogenous, society always prefers transparency. But, when the
central bank is allowed to choose the regime, transparency need not be the outcome.
This paper has a clear message: Transparency helps to build reputation. Thus, it provides
a rationale for the adoption of greater openness by central banks with histories of relatively
high inﬂation, like the Bank of England, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand. In addition, transparency is likely to have signiﬁcant beneﬁts for a young
central bank, like the ECB.
The ECB may be reluctant to disclose its internal forecasts because they are based on euro
area models and statistics which have properties that are not yet completely understood.
However, this only increases the importance of the publication of forecasts, because the
market will face the same or even greater uncertainties, making the interpretation of the































24For the U.S., Romer and Romer (1996) show that commercial inﬂation forecasts respond positively to
changes in the Federal Funds rate, contradicting the negative effect predicted by the present model. However, a
variation of the model with a different timing structure is able to generate results consistent with their ﬁndings
(and the puzzling behavior of the U.S. term structure in response to monetary policy). This is addressed in a
paper in progress.
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Another counter argument could be that the ECB should be judged on its inﬂation perfor-
mance, not its forecasts. However, it will take several years before the ECB has established
a track record. Meanwhile, the market will try to ﬁnd out the ECB’s commitment to low
inﬂation by looking at its actions, changes in the interest rate. The release of conditional
forecasts allows the market to interpret this signal of the ECB’s intentions more accurately.
So, the ECBhas alot togain from economic transparency. Ofcourse, economic transparency
would also beneﬁt central banks that already have a well-established reputation, like the
Federal Reserve. It allows the public to infer the central bank’s intentions more accurately
from its actions, which contributes to greater stability in ﬁnancial markets. This in turn,
gives the central bank more freedom to respond to economic disturbances, providing greater
stability in the economy.
Furthermore, the publication of conditional forecasts provides an excellent way to improve
accountability. A central bank can use it to explain the public why adjustments in interest
rates are needed. After all, if monetary policy is very effective, inﬂation will remain subdued
and the public may accuse the central bank of unnecessarily depressing output when it raises
the interest rate. However, the conditional forecasts help to motivate the central bank’s
actions; they tell the public what would happen if the central bank didn’t act.
Finally, it should be mentioned that many central banks have not adopted transparency, de-
spite all the beneﬁts. But with the recent trend towards independent central banks with a
clear political mandate for price stability, it would not be surprising if more central banks
become convinced of the advantages of economic transparency.
28                                                                                                  ECB Working Paper No 41 l  January 2001A Appendix
This appendix contains the derivation of the results discussed in section 3.
A.1 Perfect Equilibrium for Endogenous Regime
This section proves that transparency is the unique, pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in the
simpliﬁed model of section 3.2, when the market’s beliefs off the equilibrium path are re-
stricted to be rational. First, it is shown that opaqueness cannot be an equilibrium because
central banks with low inﬂation targets prefer to deviate. Second, it is shown that there is no
equilibrium in which some central banks decide to adopt transparency and some opaqueness.
Finally, it is shown that transparency is indeed an equilibrium.









￿. Consider now whether
it is optimal for some central banks to deviate and adopt transparency. Using (27), central































The central bank that would be indifferent, whose threshold inﬂation target is denoted by
~
￿,




















































































￿, there exists a threshold
~
￿ so that
opaqueness cannot be a perfect equilibrium.
Suppose that there is a threshold equilibrium such that a central bank with inﬂation target
~



























































￿) the central bank prefers a regime of






































].26 Using (27) one can show that the threshold
~




























































































































































































￿,27 so that the right-hand side is convex as well. Furthermore, the
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means that no threshold equilibrium exists.










whether it is optimal for some central banks to deviate and adopt opaqueness. Using (27),































The central bank that would be indifferent, whose inﬂation target is denoted by
~
￿, sat-




































































Note that the right-hand side is strictly positive. Furthermore, the right-hand side is increas-
































1 . Hence, this equation has no solution for
~
z, which means
that there exists no threshold
~
￿ such that deviation from transparency is preferred. Therefore,
transparency is the unique, pure-strategy perfect equilibrium.28
A.2 Quadratic Objective Function
This section derives the results for the quadratic central bank objective function (28). In
period two, the central bank maximizes
W
2 with respect to
i






































































































































































) is also convex.







]) are rational, transparency would
not be a perfect equilibrium because there would always exist types with sufﬁciently large
￿
￿ that prefer to
deviate. This is a consequence of the unbounded support of the distribution of
￿
￿.
















































￿. Thus, it is in the central bank’s interest to reveal its type
through its actions.
In the ﬁrst period, the central bank maximizes the expected value of
U with respect to
i
1



























































































































































]. Using the fact that
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￿; the magnitude of the effect of the interest rate
on inﬂation expectations is smaller under opaqueness because it is a noisier signal of the






















T. In the absence of uncertainty about
the shocks, the effect of interest rates on inﬂation expectations is the same for opaqueness
and transparency.30



























































































































































































































































































































































1). Notice that the responsiveness of the interest






















































T and the outcomes under opaqueness
and transparency are identical.
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Substituting (39) into (31), and using (41) and (42) gives after some rearranging the expected








































































































































































































































































































































































































3 , however, because


























































































T. This is a parabola in
￿


















































] exists where central banks are better off with opaqueness.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Thus, ﬁnding a perfect equilibrium with thresholds
￿ and
￿















































































































g is also an equilibrium. So,
(pure strategy) threshold equilibria always come in symmetric pairs. This is not surpris-
ing given the symmetry of the problem when the objective function is quadratic in output.
32The same caveat applies as in footnote 11.





























0, which leads to a contradiction.
Pairs of threshold equilibria can be computed numerically using (44). This tends to give





becomes very large, the magnitude of
z and
￿
z gives rise to numerical problems with the
evaluation of the densities and no equilibrium values can be computed.
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